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Abstract The theory of event coding (TEC) is a general
framework explaining how perceived and produced events
(stimuli and responses) are cognitively represented and
how their representations interact to generate perception
and action. This article discusses the implications of TEC
for understanding the control of voluntary action and makes
an attempt to apply, specify, and concretize the basic theo-
retical ideas in the light of the available research on action
control. In particular, it is argued that the major control
operations may take place long before a stimulus is encoun-
tered (the prepared-reXex principle), that stimulus-response
translation may be more automatic than commonly thought,
that action selection and execution are more interwoven
than most approaches allow, and that the acquisition of
action-contingent events (action eVects) is likely to sub-
serve both the selection and the evaluation of actions.
Life inside and outside of psychological laboratories diVers
in many ways, which is particularly true with respect to
action control. Outside the lab people seem to carry out
actions to achieve particular goals and to adapt the environ-
ment according to their needs. Once they enter a lab, how-
ever, they are commonly talked into responding to arbitrary
stimuli by carrying out meaningless movements. The latter
is assumed to increase the amount of experimental control
over the variables involved in performing an action, which
of course is true and utterly important for disentangling all
the confounds present in everyday actions. And yet, most
models of action control seem to take this highly artiWcial
stimulus-response situation so serious that they use it as a
template for voluntary action in general. In fact, almost all
introductory textbooks of cognitive psychology do not only
neglect most aspects of action control, but they also reduce
action to a mere byproduct of perception and reasoning.
We could have seen this coming. In the last half of the
nineteenth century there were two dominant forces that
shaped psychological theorizing with regard to action con-
trol. On the one hand, there were authors who relied mainly
on introspection, an approach that not surprisingly was
strongly driven by our everyday concept of action as a
means to achieve wanted outcomes. Authors like Lotze
(1852), Harless (1861), and James (1890) were interested in
the question how the mere thought of a particular action (or
its outcomes) can eventually lead to its execution or, more
generally speaking, how we can voluntarily move our body
in the absence of any conscious insight into motor processes
(executive ignorance). Action was thus reconstructed by
starting the analysis with a goal or to-be-achieved eVect and
then asking how motor processes are used to achieve this
eVect. According to this logic, action is a means to generate
perceptions (of outcomes) and to the degree that these per-
ceptions can be anticipated and systematically produced
action is considered voluntary. On the other hand, there
were authors who followed Descartes’ strategy of tracing
the perceptual sensations produced by external stimuli
through the body, with muscle contractions being the Wnal
result. Particularly important for the further development of
experimental psychology and the cognitive neurosciences
was the approach of Donders (1868). He suggested analyti-
cally segmenting the processing stream from the sensory
organ to the muscle into separate, sequential stages and to
measure the duration of each stage by systematically
manipulating task factors related to it. According to the
logic underlying this approach, action is a consequence of
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sensory processing but not its precursor, which makes the
action truly a response and the stimulus it’s most important
predictor.
Donders’ methodological approach turned out to be far
more useful for the emerging discipline of experimental
psychology and related areas of the cognitive neurosciences
than the nineteenth century introspective armchair reason-
ing. After the necessary adjustments and reWnements
(Sternberg, 1969), the technique to use reaction times to
segment information-processing streams into stages was
widely used and still dominates research in several areas
(such as dual-task performance, see Pashler, 1994). Indeed,
from the currently available textbooks it is easy to see that
Donders’ approach has inXuenced our thinking most:
actions are commonly referred to as responses and consid-
ered to be mainly controlled by the stimulus and the way it
is processed. However, the recent interest in what is com-
monly called executive functions (the term that replaced the
outdated “will”) has revealed the shortcomings of a purely
stimulus-driven approach and lead to a revival not of the
methods but of the analytical perspective of the introspec-
tive theorists. In the following, I would like to focus on the
probably most comprehensive approach involved in this
revival, the Theory of Event Coding (or TEC: Hommel,
Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001a, b). I will brieXy
review the main assumptions of what was considered a
meta-theoretical framework that, among other things, inte-
grates ideomotor theorizing with Prinz’s (1990) common-
coding hypothesis (which claims that perception and action
rely on shared cognitive representations) and Hommel’s
(1997) action-concept model (which holds that human cog-
nition is based on integrated sensorimotor units), and elabo-
rate on the implications of these assumptions for action
control. Then I go on to discuss how a TEC-inspired
approach changes the way actions are reconstructed and
analyzed, and how this aVects our understanding of how
stimulus and action events are processed and cognitively
represented, and how actions are selected, prepared,
planned, and evaluated. Even though more research is cer-
tainly needed, accumulating evidence suggests that the
TEC-driven approach is not only tenable but, even more
importantly, that it is fruitful in generating novel theoretical
questions and experimental strategies.
The ideomotor principle
What Lotze (1852), Harless (1861), James (1890) and
related theorists intended to explain was how having the
idea of an action translates into that action’s execution,
which is why their approach has been coined ideo-motor
(Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1987; Stock & Stock, 2004). The
ideomotor approach has suVered from a notoriously bad
press, however. Thorndike (1913) compared it to the super-
stitious believes of primitive people in the power of their
thoughts to magically change things in the world, and
Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) concluded that all this
approach has to oVer for bridging the gap from knowledge
to action is the hyphen between ideo and motor. In contrast
to the claims and own achievements of these historically
pretty successful attempts to ridicule ideomotor theorizing,
the ideomotor approach was rather speciWc with regard to
the basic mechanism underlying action control. Figure 1
shows the neural scenario suggested by James (1890). Con-
sider a motor neuron M the activation of which moves a
Muscle, which again provides kinesthetic feedback by acti-
vating neuron K. This may represent the neural hardware a
newborn is equipped with or the neural software it prena-
tally acquired. When exploring the world, the newborn may
at some point get neuron M activated, be it through a reXex
or arousal induced by sensations (represented by S), or sim-
ply by motor noise (sometimes called “motor babbling”).
Whatever its cause, this activation results in a movement
that produces the kinesthetic perception that is associated
with the activation of K. If this happened only once, not
much would follow. If, however, activating M regularly
leads to the activation of K, trace conditioning creates an
association between M and K, following the Hebbian prin-
ciple that what Wres together wires together (cf. Greenwald,
1970). Accordingly, K would become a kind of retrieval
cue for M, so that re-creating or anticipating the perceptual
experience coded by K becomes a means of activating M in
a now intentional fashion: the activation of M, and of the
movement this invokes, has come under intentional control.
Obviously, the same logic applies to any other sensory
modality, so that the codes of any perceptual consequence
or eVect of a given movement can become integrated with
the motor neurons producing this movement and thus
become its cognitive representation.
The notion that the motor patterns underlying voluntary
actions are represented by codes of their perceptual eVects has
received ample empirical support. Elsner and Hommel (2001)
Fig. 1 James’ (1890) neural model of acquiring ideomotor control
(see text for explanation). Taken from James (1890, p. 582)514 Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526
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have demonstrated that introducing novel auditory action
eVects, such as tones of a particular pitch that sound contin-
gent on pressing a particular key, renders these eVects
primes and retrieval cues of the actions they accompany.
For instance, if adults have experienced that left and right
key presses systematically produce high- and low-pitched
sounds, presenting these sounds as stimuli later on facili-
tated performance if the sound–key mapping heeded the
previous key–sound mapping. Moreover, if subjects were
presented with a free-choice task after having experienced
particular key–sound contingencies, presenting a sound as a
mere trigger signal increased the frequency of choosing the
action that previously had produced this sound. Compara-
ble Wndings have been obtained in numerous labs and with
various tasks, stimuli, actions, and eVects, and with partici-
pants of various ages (for an overview, see Hommel &
Elsner, 2009), which points to a rather general action-eVect
integration mechanism. Studies using neuroimaging tech-
niques have shown that facing a previously learned action
eVect leads to the activation of a number of action-related
brain areas. In particular, auditory action eVects activate the
right hippocampus, which presumably links the sensory
eVect representations to their corresponding action plans,
and the supplementary motor area, which presumably
houses these plans (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher et al.,
2008). Of particular interest, even though the observed acti-
vations were elicited by the presentation of a stimulus (an
action eVect), the responding cortical areas were those that
are typically involved in controlling endogenously planned
but not stimulus-triggered actions—which Wts with the
notion that the codes of action eVects are used for control-
ling voluntary action. Finally, a number of Wndings have
demonstrated that the compatibility between features of the
action proper and features of its eVects have an impact on
reaction time and, thus, on response selection. For instance,
keypresses responses are initiated faster if they trigger
visual events in spatially corresponding rather than non-
corresponding locations (Kunde, 2001), suggesting that the
spatial codes of both the key to be pressed and the visual
event to be produced are considered when selecting a
response. Comparable eVects of action-eVect compatibility
have been reported for temporal (Kunde, 2003), semantic
(Koch & Kunde, 2002), and other relations between actions
and eVects.
Coding and representing stimulus and action events
If actions are cognitively represented by codes of their per-
ceptual consequences, one may ask whether representations
of perceived events and of produced actions diVer at all.
TEC makes the strong claim that they do not. Considering
typical laboratory tasks this claim may be surprising.
Subjects typically stare at a computer monitor and are
brieXy  Xashed with arbitrary symbols, which they then
under enormous time pressure translate into arbitrarily
assigned key presses. Accordingly, it may make sense to
consider the processes between the stimulus-produced light
hitting the retina and some hypothetical internal identiWca-
tion process perception and most of what follows until the
key is pressed as action (or response). But our eyes are nei-
ther made for staring at particular locations on computer
screens, nor are they particular good at this task, as indi-
cated by the diYculty and eVort needed to keep one’s eye at
the indicated spot. Quite on the contrary, outside the lab our
eyes use to jump around about four times a second and they
do so in order to create stimuli on the retina but not to
respond to them. The same logic holds for other sensory
modalities: hearing often beneWts from orienting one’s
body or head towards stimulus sources and tactile percep-
tion would virtually be impossible without systematically
moving one’s eVectors across the to-be-perceived surface.
This means that perception is just as well the consequence
of action than it is its cause or, as Dewey (1896) suggested,
perception and action may be better conceived as mutually
coordinated rather than causing each other. Hence, percep-
tion is not something imposed on us by a stimulus but the
experience associated with performing an action: perceiv-
ing, that is.
Once one accepts that perceiving and acting is the same
thing (carrying out movements to create particular eVects),
it makes a bit more sense to assume that perceived events
and produced actions are represented in the same way. TEC
argues that the ideomotor approach provides a good basis
for this consideration. To take the scenario sketched in
Fig. 1, the emerging link between M and K, and any other
perceptually derived code (say, V, A, O, T, and P for the
visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, and proprioceptive feed-
back provided by the movement resulting from activating
M), can be considered as the representation of both the per-
ceptions one can experience by carrying out the M-induced
movement and the action needed to produce them. Accord-
ingly, the representation can subserve the anticipation of
upcoming perceptual experience just as well as the selec-
tion of actions according to their expected outcomes—it
thus is a truly sensorimotor unit subserving the needs of
perceiving and acting.
Two further assumptions of TEC are important for the
theoretical reconstruction of action control. One is that cog-
nitive representations are composites of feature codes. The
primate brain does not represent events by individual
neurons or local neural populations but, rather, by widely
distributed feature networks. The visual cortex consists of
numerous representational maps that are coding for all sorts
of visual features, such as color, orientation, shape, or
motion (DeYoe & Van Essen, 1988) and other sensoryPsychological Research (2009) 73:512–526 515
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cortices have been reported to contain feature maps as well.
The same goes for the brain areas involved in action
planning, which comprise of separable networks to code,
for instance, the direction (Georgopoulos, 1990), force
(Kalaska & Hyde, 1985), and distance (Riehle & Requin,
1989) of manual actions. The assumption that cognitive
event representations are composites has two further
implications. One implication is that binding operations are
necessary to relate the codes referring to the same event.
That is, activating or re-activating feature codes may not
necessarily be suYcient to perceive or produce an event;
instead the activation of these codes may need to be
followed  by their integration. Another implication of rep-
resenting events in a feature-based fashion is that diVerent
events can be related to, compared with, or confused with
each other based on the number of features they share.
Hence, if one considers the number of features shared
between events as their similarity, events can be more or
less similar to each other and, given the sensorimotor
nature of the cognitive representations, perceptions and
actions can be as well.
A second important assumption underlying TEC is that
cognitive representations refer to distal but not proximal
aspects of the represented events (Prinz, 1992). Unfortu-
nately, the terms distal and proximal are used in various,
not always well-deWned ways, often to distinguish between
eVectors, muscles, or actions far from versus close to the
body, respectively. TEC relies on the more speciWc termi-
nology of Heider (1926, 1930) and Brunswik (1944). These
authors addressed the veridicality of our perception and
how we can experience the attributes of objects in the world
in our minds. According to their analysis, four diVerent lay-
ers of perceptual processing are important to consider. The
Wrst layer (D, using the terms of Heider, 1930) refers to the
objects, people, and events in our environment that are rele-
vant for our life. It is this layer that Heider refers to as distal
and where the things we perceive can be objectively deW-
ned. The second, proximal layer (V) refers to the physical
information about these things that reaches our sense
organs. One of the problems Heider and Brunswik consider
is that the relationship between D and V is not invariant but
depends on the medium (e.g., air, water, environmental
conditions) through which the information is provided. V is
thus not a valid and complete copy of D but only provides
cues about the things deWned at D. The next layer (V) con-
sists of the direct physiological correlate of V, such as the
neural patterns in the receiving sense organs and closely
related processing systems. In the absence of dramatic
changes or damages of the sense organs, the relationship
between V and V is assumed to be dictated more or less by
physics and biology and thus more or less direct and invari-
ant. The fourth layer refers to the central experience of the
external thing (D), which is assumed to correspond to V’
no better than V corresponds to D. According to Heider and
Brunswik, the theoretical challenge consists in explaining
why D can correspond so well to D despite the incomplete
correspondences along the way of the perceptual process
(i.e., between D and V and between V and D). Impor-
tantly for present purposes, any possible to-be-perceived
event necessarily has a distal and a proximal representation
in the world (D and V, respectively) and internal represen-
tations that refer to these external representations (D and
V, respectively). Brunswik (1944) has extended this logic
to action, where the distal goal object and the proximal
means to achieve it are assumed to be internally represented
by central representations and peripheral muscle com-
mands, respectively. As pointed out by Prinz (1992), proxi-
mal internal representations of perceived and produced
events (early sensory and motor patterns that is, irrespective
of modality and content) are not closely related to their cen-
tral representations and to each other, so that it is diYcult to
believe that feature-based interactions between perception
and action occur on these levels. More plausible is the
assumption that such interactions take place between the
distal representations of perceived and produced events,
that is, between the representations of stimulus and action
features as they appear in the external world. This is why
TEC focuses on distal but not proximal internal representa-
tions.
Given the distal focus of TEC the theory does not
address, and cannot explain, how the transition is made
between proximal and distal representations. With regard to
action control, this means that the theory does not account
for all aspects involved in generating a particular motor pat-
tern. This limitation is by no means accidental but is meant
to reXect the way actions are controlled. According to early
ideas of Keele (1968), actions are generated by retrieving
motor programs, which back then were assumed to consist
of sets of muscle instructions that make for a complete
feedforward program. The idea that all aspects of an action
are centrally determined in advance is not particularly real-
istic, however. Theoretical reasons to doubt that consider
the enormous storage problem the maintenance of all possi-
ble combinations of muscle parameters would imply and
the diYculty to generalize from existing programs to novel,
never before performed movements (Schmidt, 1975).
Empirical reasons relate to observations that some action
parameters can be Xexibly adjusted on the Xy, even in the
absence of any conscious knowledge of the acting person
about the adjustment (Prablanc & Pélisson, 1990). This
suggests that the feedforward components of action control
do not completely determine an action but, rather, (a) spec-
ify only those parameters that are essential for achieving
the intended action eVects; (b) leave the speciWcation of
nonessential parameters to lower-level sensorimotor online
channels with characteristics that Milner and Goodale516 Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526
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(1995) ascribed to what they called the dorsal route1; and
(c) constrain the processing characteristics of those lower-
level channels by “directing their attention” to the task-rele-
vant stimulus features—a process that I will describe in the
next section.
Apart from the available theoretical and empirical rea-
sons for this distribution of labor between oZine action
control and online parameter speciWcation, there are two
implications of TEC that also favor such a dual architec-
ture. First, TEC assumes that action planning is based on
distal representations. Given the indirect relationship
between internal proximal and distal representational lev-
els (Heider’s V and D), which implies a loss of concrete
information in the transition from proximal to distal codes,
and the need for very speciWc information needed to Wll in
the remaining gaps of feedforward action plans, it makes
sense to assume that the Wlling is left to the representa-
tional level that keeps closest touch with the physical
input—the proximal level that is. Hence, proximal and dis-
tal codes may selectively target and serve to inform online
and oZine control, respectively. Second, feedforward
action plans are assumed to be associated with codes of
action eVects that an agent can imagine and that he or she
can actively intend to select and control the action that is
likely to reproduce those eVects. What people can and will
imagine commonly refers to invariant properties of a given
action but not to concrete parameters that will often
change with the context, the eVector being used, and the
posture assumed before starting the movement (Rosen-
baum, Loukopoulos, Meulenbroek, Vaughan & Engelbr-
echt, 1995). Indeed, the success of an action (evaluating
which requires a comparison between intended and actual
outcomes, see below) is commonly judged based on the
action’s general, invariant properties (whether or not the
cup of coVee was brought to one’s mouth, say) but not on
speciWc parameter values (e.g., how fast this was done or
along which path in space the hand traveled). This implies
that storing speciWc parameter values would be of little use
for selecting, planning, or monitoring an action—the more
so as they change frequently and would be diYcult to
learn, which suggests that detailed values are commonly
not considered for long-term storage (so that even top
sportsmen need to practice). But these parameters must
come from somewhere, which implies that another, senso-
rimotor level must be involved.
Preparing for perceiving and acting
Dondersian experimental analyses of the processing stages
intervening between stimulus presentation and response
presuppose that all the interesting cognitive processes take
place in between these two events. Consider, for instance,
how Donders (1868) assessed the human will. By compar-
ing reaction times between tasks with diVering stimulus-
and response-processing demands he managed to isolate
and measure the duration of what nowadays would be
called response selection, which he called the “determina-
tion of the will”. Obviously, the idea was that people would
await a stimulus and only then start thinking about what to
do. Even though more modern versions of Donders’ stage
analysis (e.g., Pashler & Johnston, 1989; Sternberg, 1969)
would not deny that stimulus-response links are somehow
prepared before a stimulus is processed, they do not have
the methodological means to consider these preparation
processes in their analytical designs. Accordingly, prepara-
tion is commonly not an issue in stage-theoretical
approaches. And yet, especially with regard to action con-
trol there are reasons to assume that some if not all of the
more interesting processes take place long before the stimu-
lus appears. Probably the Wrst who considered this possibil-
ity was Sigmund Exner (1879), who discussed the example
of a speeded manual response to the onset of a visual stimu-
lus. He noticed that long before the stimulus comes up, he
had already set himself into some kind of state that ensured
that the response would be carried out eYciently and as
intended. Evoking that state is a voluntary, attention-
demanding act, so he argued, but once the state is created
the response is actually involuntary or at least automatic in
the sense that no further eVort of will is needed to translate
the stimulus into the action. If so, traditional reaction time
analyses would tap into the more or less automatic chain of
processes previously set up by will or, to use a more mod-
ern term, executive control. In other words, what most psy-
chological experiments are picking up might be considered
willfully prepared reXexes (Hommel, 2000; Hommel &
Elsner, 2009), in addition to the impact of automatically
created stimulus-response instances (Logan, 1988) or bind-
ings (Hommel, 1998a, 2004).
One may encounter this rather skeptical view by arguing
that task-preparation processes are successfully addressed
by the rapidly increasing number of task-switching studies
(e.g., Monsell, 2003). In these studies, people switch back
and forth between multiple tasks, what commonly creates
separable performance costs on trials that require a switch.
However, the repetitive nature of these studies raises the
possibility that people prepare for and schedule task
switches just like any other task-speciWc process, so to
automatize the act of switching. Indeed, not only is there
evidence that substantial amounts of task-switching costs
1 From these considerations it should be clear that TEC considers
action plans less complete than other approaches do. TEC agrees with
feedforward control models (see Jordan & Wolpert, 1999) that actions
are, or at least can be planned ahead of time but disagrees with the fre-
quent assumption that this kind of planning is suYcient to specify all
the parameters needed and to specify them as precisely as needed—
with the possible exception of very simple, completely ballistic move-
ments.Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526 517
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actually reXect proactive interference (Allport, Styles &
Hsieh, 1994), stimulus-induced task-set retrieval conXicts
(Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003), and other preparation-
unrelated processes (Wylie & Allport, 2000), but even the
remaining process of implementing the appropriate task set
may be realized by automatic retrieval induced by the task-
switching cue (see Logan, Schneider & Bundesen, 2007). If
so, even true switching costs may measure nothing but the
time demands of previously prepared cognitive reXexes.
A number of recent observations support the prepared
reXex notion. For instance, Kunde, Kiesel, and HoVmann
(2003) found that subliminally presented irrelevant stimuli
can trigger actions if they Wt the apparently previously
established stimulus-response rule—even if these stimuli
never served as targets and were not encountered earlier in
the experiment. Wenke, Gaschler, and Nattkemper (2005)
demonstrated that stimulus-response rules held in mind for
a later trial are automatically applied to stimuli in another,
intervening task. Along the same lines, Cohen-Kdoshay
and Meiran (2007) found that, in a Xanker task, response-
incompatible Xankers interfere with responding even in the
very Wrst trial, that is, before any experience-based stimu-
lus-response association could have been established.
TEC provides two theoretical tools to understand how
preparation enables action control. First, it assumes that
feature codes the activation of which overlaps in time are
automatically integrated into event Wles (Hommel, 1998a,
2004; Hommel et al., 2001a). Integration occurs irrespec-
tive of the temporal sequence of the underlying distal
events, what matters is only whether these events induce
activations that fall into the same integration window.
There is evidence that people can tailor the size of integra-
tion windows to the situation at hand (e.g., to the temporal
density of events: Akyürek, ToVanin & Hommel, 2008) and
tend to lose sequential information if two events fall into
the same window (Akyürek et al., 2008; Akyürek, Riddell,
ToVanin & Hommel, 2007). This integration mechanism is
perfectly suited to allow for both stimulus-response learn-
ing and response-eVect (i.e., response-stimulus) learning, as
it does not care whether the stimulus leads or follows the
action. It is also perfectly suited to generate ideomotor
action. Note that for ideomotor theory to work the original
sequence of processing Wrst the action and then the eVect
(when experiencing an eVect for the Wrst time) needs to be
reversed when reactivating the action code by activating the
code of its eVect. In other words, ideomotor action control
presupposes that action-eVect learning generalizes to eVect-
action retrieval—which again requires a mechanism that
does not care about brief time delays. Indeed, there is ample
evidence that actions and stimuli are automatically bound
irrespective of whether the stimulus leads or follows the
action (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009; Elsner & Hommel, 2001;
Hommel, 2005). The underlying binding mechanism allows
for both episodic learning when running through the trials
of an experiment (comparable to instance learning as envi-
sioned by Logan, 1988) and the preparation of task-related
stimulus-response and response-eVect bindings before per-
forming a task. Given that integration relies on code activa-
tion but not stimulus presentation or response execution,
and given that ideomotor theory assumes that eVect and
action codes must be accessible and activatable by “think-
ing of” (i.e., generating the idea of) the coded events, imag-
ining and playing through the task rules and relevant
sequences of stimuli, responses, and eVects is likely to cre-
ate the code-activation overlap necessary for integration. If
so, mentally playing through a task should result in weak
but functional bindings between stimuli and responses and
between responses and eVects. The weakness of these pre-
liminary bindings may well lead to errors (which are often
observed during the Wrst trials of experiments) but these
will quickly be avoided by adding experience-based bind-
ings acquired through practice.
The second mechanism TEC provides for understanding
the impact of preparatory operations on performance is
“intentional weighting” (Hommel et al., 2001a). The
assumption is that preparing for a task involves the priming
of task-relevant feature dimensions, such as color, shape, or
perhaps higher order perceptual or semantic features. Prim-
ing a feature dimension increases the impact of features
being coded on it on object selection and performance. One
example for how this mechanism works comes from
Memelink and Hommel (2005, 2006). They interleaved a
two-dimensional Simon task (which could produce both
horizontal and vertical stimulus-response compatibility
eVects) with another task that required either horizontal or
vertical stimulus coding. This other task strongly impacted
performance in the Simon task by increasing compatibility
eVects on the dimension it made salient and decreasing
compatibility eVects of the other dimension. Further evi-
dence is provided by Fagioli, Hommel, and Schubotz
(2007) and Wykowska, Schubö, and Hommel (2008). They
showed that preparing a manual grasping or reaching action
facilitates the detection and discrimination of targets in an
unrelated interleaved task if these targets are deWned on
action-relevant dimensions (like shape or size and color or
contrast, respectively). This latter observation is particu-
larly interesting with regard to the interaction between
high-level feedforward action programming and low-level
sensorimotor online adaptation. In contrast to Milner and
Goodale (1995), who attribute the entire control of action to
such online channels, TEC (Hommel, 1996; Hommel et al.,
2001b) and related approaches (e.g., Glover, 2004) main-
tain that high-level processes take care of the feedforward
programming of goal-relevant action characteristics,
whereas low-level processes are responsible for the online
adaptation of the action to current circumstances. This latter518 Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526
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assumption raises the question of how high-level processes
can steer low-level processes towards the stimulus informa-
tion that is needed to Wll in the parameters left open by
action programming. Intentional weighting along the lines
of Fagioli et al. (2007) and Wykowska et al. (2008) pro-
vides an answer: low-level channels process any available
information in principle but the top-down weighting of
task-relevant stimulus dimensions makes sure that stimulus
codes from these dimensions dominate the speciWcation of
open action parameters (Hommel, 2009). For instance, pre-
paring for the grasp of an object may involve the pre-pro-
gramming of invariant characteristics of the approach
movement, the relation between hand aperture and object
size, and so forth, as well as the top-down priming of size-
related feature maps so to facilitate the processing of size
information by online channels.
Activating stimulus and action codes
Once the task intentions have been transformed into the
appropriate event Wles, stimuli can automatically induce
activation of the event representations they refer to. Event
Wles are considered networks of codes that may relate to
any event-related aspect, such as activation conditions and
context, actions and action eVects, or thoughts that regu-
larly accompany the event. Their activation follows a pat-
tern-completion logic, which means that activating one
member of a network will automatically spread activation
to all the other members. However, how strong and eYcient
activation will spread depends on whether and how
strongly the dimension on which a given network member
is deWned is primed by task relevance, i.e., intentionally
weighted. Hommel, Memelink, Zmigrod, and Colzato
(2008) investigated under which circumstances previously
created stimulus-action bindings involving color, shape,
and (response-) location codes aVect performance in the
following trial. As has been observed previously (Hommel,
1998a), performance was worse if the present shape-
response and color-response combinations partially mis-
matched the combinations in the previous trials, so that one
feature was repeated while the other alternated. This sug-
gested that stimulus and response codes were automatically
bound and retrieved upon repetition of any feature. Impor-
tantly, however, bindings that matched the current atten-
tional set had a stronger impact on performance, and this
was true irrespective under which attentional set these bind-
ings had been created. This suggests that task relevance and
the corresponding attentional biases do not aVect the crea-
tion of bindings between stimulus and response information
but the retrieval of these bindings. More speciWcally, the
attentional set strongly aVects which ingredients of an event
Wle are reactivated during event-Wle retrieval. However rich
and comprehensive thus an event Wle may be, in a given sit-
uation mainly the task-relevant (or otherwise primed) codes
it includes will be reactivated.2
The TEC approach to the representation of stimulus and
action events and the way these representations are con-
trolled explains various phenomena that otherwise are hard
to understand and it turned out to be successful in leading to
the discovery of various novel phenomena. EVects of com-
patibility between stimuli and responses (such as Simon or
Stroop eVects) are an example. Compatibility eVects are
commonly attributed to the similarity between stimuli and
responses and the overlap of stimulus and response repre-
sentations (cf., Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990;
Prinz, 1990; Wallace, 1971). Unfortunately, however, most
approaches are silent with regard to the crucial questions of
(a) in which sense stimulus and response features can over-
lap at all and (b) how these features are cognitively repre-
sented in such a way that overlap can produce compatibility
eVects. For instance, the dimensional overlap model of
Kornblum et al. (1990) merely assumes that a stimulus that
feature-overlaps with a response automatically primes this
response’s representation without explaining why and how.
TEC (as other ideomotor approaches: e.g., Greenwald,
1970) provides an intuitive and mechanistically straightfor-
ward answer: if two given representations feature-overlap
they are literally related to the same neural codes, that is,
they physically overlap in the sense that they share ingredi-
ents.3 Whether these representations function to represent
the stimulus or the response in a given task does not matter
and does not have any implication for the way the event is
represented.
TEC also explains why feature overlap can create com-
patibility eVects even if one of the overlapping features is
actually task irrelevant. For instance, the Simon eVect
refers to the observation that spatial responses to non-spa-
tial stimulus features (such as color or shape) are faster if
2 Even though features from task-relevant dimensions have consis-
tently been observed to produce considerably stronger and more reli-
able eVects, features of task-irrelevant dimensions do not seem to be
entirely ineVective (e.g., Hommel, 1998a; Hommel & Colzato, 2004),
even though their impact is sometimes only transient and disappears
with increasing practice (Colzato, RaVone & Hommel, 2006). It is
possible that nominally irrelevant features are top-down primed by
processing strategies (e.g., to weight and process all features of a stim-
ulus equally in the beginning of a task and to focus attention on rele-
vant information with increasing expertise) and chronic attention to
particular dimensions, and that particularly salient features attract
attention in a bottom-up fashion. Thus, intentional weighting seems to
bias processing towards relevant information but does not seem to
exclude irrelevant information altogether.
3 This logic has recently been extended to aVective features of stimuli
and responses (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Lavender & Hommel,
2007), which allows an account of aVective stimulus-response interac-
tions (e.g., Beckers, De Houwer & Eelen, 2002; De Houwer & Eelen,
1998) in terms of TEC.Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526 519
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the stimulus location corresponds to the response location
(Simon & Rudell, 1967). Numerous authors have wondered
why stimulus location is considered at all in a task where
the relevant stimulus feature is not spatially deWned, and
they have postulated dedicated mechanisms that function to
create spatial stimulus codes even under such circum-
stances. For instance, Umiltà and Nicoletti (1992) and
StoVer (1991) have claimed that it is actually not the stimulus
that is spatially coded but the movement of the attentional
focus towards the stimulus location. Given the Simon
eVects can be related to all sorts of spatial reference frames,
such as egocentrically, allocentrically, object-relative, or
eVector-relative stimulus location (e.g., Hommel & Lippa,
1995; Lamberts, Tavernier & d’Ydewalle, 1992), and that
Simon-type eVects have been reported for non-spatial fea-
ture overlap (e.g., Kornblum, 1994), attentional approaches
have an extremely limited scope and fail to address all but
the original version of the Simon eVect. In contrast, TEC
provides a straightforward account that applies to all exist-
ing versions: given that the responses in a Simon task are
spatially deWned, the corresponding spatial stimulus maps
are intentionally weighted—so to allow for the proper spa-
tial coding of the responses (i.e., the discrimination and
identiWcation of spatial action eVects). As stimuli and
responses are coded in the same way and by using the same
stimulus maps, the system is structurally unable to prime
the processing of response locations without priming the
processing of the locations of any other event—such as the
stimuli in a Simon task.
Somewhat paradoxically, this account predicts that the
spatial Simon eVect should be reduced or even absent if the
responses would not be spatially deWned, which of course is
hard to test in a task that relies on spatial responses to mea-
sure the eVect. But there are reasons to assume that the pre-
diction holds nevertheless. By using ERPs, Valle-Inclán
and Redondo (1998) replicated earlier observations that lat-
eralized stimuli activate lateralized readiness potentials
(LRPs) in the opposite cortical hemisphere, suggesting that
stimuli can indeed activate spatially corresponding eVec-
tors. Interestingly, the relevant S-R mapping was not Wxed
in this study, but varied randomly from trial to trial, as did
the temporal order in which the mapping and the stimulus
were presented. If the mapping preceded the stimulus, the
stimulus activated the spatially corresponding response
(i.e., evoked a contralateral LRP) irrespective of which
response was actually correct. But if the stimulus preceded
the S–R mapping, this activation was no longer observed. If
we consider that the response set could only be prepared if
the mapping was known, we can conclude that the auto-
matic processing of stimulus location up to the activation of
responses, the hallmark of the Simon eVect, presupposes
that the task is properly prepared. As predicted by TEC,
preparing for action involves the intentional weighting of
response-related feature dimensions, and this is indeed
what seems to be required for the Simon eVect to occur.
The Stroop eVect seems to work the same way. The eVect
refers to the observation that naming a color is hampered by
presenting it in the shape of an incongruent color word
(Stroop, 1935). Interestingly, the eVect is much more pro-
nounced with vocal than with manual responses (cf.,
Magen & Cohen, 2007). According to TEC, this is what
one would expect as preparing for uttering color names
should lead to the stronger intentional weighting of coding
systems that are involved in processing the vocal action
eVects: color words, which happen to be the main distrac-
tors in this task.
Apart from its more ambitious scope, the advantage of
TEC over alternative accounts of stimulus-response com-
patibility is that it does not only predict that feature overlap
between stimuli and responses aVects performance but it
also explains why this is the case. But TEC is also able to
predict novel compatibility eVects that other accounts have
no obvious way to handle. Note that what experimenters
call stimuli and responses are considered by TEC as events
that play diVerent roles in a given experiment (one being
externally triggered and the other being internally gener-
ated) but that are cognitively represented in an equivalent
fashion and, most importantly, in the same coding domain.
Feature overlap between stimulus and response thus means
that neural codes are virtually shared by diVerent represen-
tations and that it is this sharing that produces stimulus-
response compatibility. If so, and if being a stimulus and a
response is just a role a given event is arranged to play, one
would expect that responses can also overlap with stimuli
and thus aVect stimulus processing. That is, TEC predicts
response-stimulus compatibility eVects. Indeed, several
types of such compatibility eVects have been demonstrated
so far. For instance, preparing a spatially deWned manual
response systematically aVects the detection (Müsseler &
Hommel, 1997a) and identiWcation (Müsseler & Hommel,
1997b) of masked arrowheads pointing in response-com-
patible or incompatible directions. The processing of masked
compatible or incompatible direction words is unaVected
by manual action preparation (Hommel & Müsseler, 2006).
In contrast, preparing for vocally responding with a direc-
tion word interacts with the identiWcation of masked visual
direction words but not with the processing of arrowheads
(Hommel & Müsseler, 2006). These observations rule out
possible interactions at a purely semantic level (which as
such would not be inconsistent with TEC) but point to
interactions between feature codes.
Another interesting prediction from a TEC perspective is
that what stage models commonly call stimulus-response
translation, a process that has widely been claimed to be
highly capacity limited and strictly serial (Pashler, 1994),
should actually occur automatically and in parallel. According520 Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526
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to TEC, stimulus and response features are integrated into
event Wles and prepared to some degree before a task is per-
formed, so that registering a stimulus should suYce to
spread activation to the related response. As the task pro-
ceeds, the stimulus-response links are further strengthened
by the continuous integration of co-varying stimulus and
response features (Hommel, 2005), making the translation
even smoother. Automatic stimulus-response translation
was indeed demonstrated under dual-task conditions, which
previous approaches considered to render automatic trans-
lation impossible. In the study of Hommel (1998b), sub-
jects carried out two responses to two stimuli in a row, as in
other dual-task studies. However, the second, vocal
response was chosen to be compatible or incompatible with
either the Wrst (manual) response or the Wrst (visual) stimu-
lus. For instance, the second response could consist in
saying “green” while the Wrst stimulus was green (i.e., com-
patible) or red (incompatible). Unsurprisingly, the second
response was aVected by compatibility with the Wrst stimu-
lus. More importantly, however, responses to the Wrst
stimulus were faster in compatible than in incompatible
conditions. Not only does this amount to another demon-
stration that activating a response can lead to the priming of
a feature-overlapping stimulus, but it also shows that the
second response was activated at a point in time when the
stimulus-response translation related to the Wrst response
was not yet completed. In other words, stimulus-response
translation for the two tasks must have occurred in parallel,
which contradicts serial translation accounts but provides
support for a TEC-inspired approach.
Selecting and planning an action
Traditional approaches to action control make a Wne dis-
tinction between the selection and the programming of an
action and this distinction seems so obvious and intuitive
that most authors use it without much theoretical justiWca-
tion (e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990; Pashler, 1994; Sanders,
1983). This is understandable from an information pro-
cessing approach to cognition that applies the computer
metaphor to biological systems. According to that perspec-
tive, selecting an action is explicitly or implicitly con-
ceived of as choosing an abstract symbol representing the
appropriate action whereas action programming consists of
translating that symbol into a program that can actually
operate on the available hardware. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, this translation process may require the
retrieval of an existing motor program or the construction
of a novel program from scratch. Action selection and pro-
gramming are commonly assumed to represent two
sequential stages, with selection being particularly capac-
ity demanding (e.g., Pashler, 1994).
It should be clear from the previous discussion that TEC
does not Wt with this traditional line of thought. Generating
the idea of an action is considered to involve the activation
of codes representing the perceivable eVects of that action.
These eVect codes are assumed to be integrated into senso-
rimotor networks or the event Wles serving both to register
and to produce the coded eVects. In other words, “thinking
of an action” always involves the tendency to generate that
action motorically by spreading activation from eVect codes
to the associated motor codes (cf., Jeannerod & Decety,
1995; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). Given that this process of
(not necessarily consciously) “thinking of an action” is
considered to be crucial for selecting an action, this has two
major implications that conXict with the traditional selec-
tion-programming distinction. First, action selection and
action programming are conceptually interwoven: if select-
ing the feature of an action consists of activating the
code(s) representing that feature and if this activation
spreads to the motor codes responsible for generating it
(i.e., shaping the performance of the action in such a way
that the given feature is produced), selecting means pro-
gramming that feature—or, in TEC terminology, selecting
an action involves planning it. Second, if action selection
and programming are that much interwoven it makes little
sense to distinguish between these two processes and to
assume that they occur in a strict temporal sequence.
A number of observations are consistent with TECs fail-
ure to distinguish between the selection and the program-
ming of an action. For instance, the time it takes to initiate
an action is known to increase with the action’s complexity,
which is assumed to reXect the greater programming
demands with more complex actions (Henry & Rogers,
1960). Along the same lines, initiation times increase with
the eventual duration of the action (Klapp, 1995) and even
with the duration of action eVects (Kunde, 2003). Interest-
ingly, reaction time for the same action increases with
the complexity of alternative actions (e.g., Rosenbaum,
Salzman & Kingman, 1984; Semjen, Garcia-Colera & Requin,
1984). This may be due to preparatory eVects but it may
just as well be that action selection is aVected by the extent
of the action plans or event Wles involved. TEC reasoning
suggests that selecting an action is a temporally extended
process of increasing the activation of feature codes up to a
threshold or until the action is initiated (see below). In the
beginning of the decision process, multiple action plans
may be activated, which would allow their codes to engage
in facilitatory or inhibitory interactions. Obviously, the
amount of interactions would be larger the more actions are
involved (which would account for Hicks’ law) and the
more complex the plans are. Evidence that the complexity
of plans is considered during response selection is provided
by Meegan and Tipper (1999), who showed that irrelevant
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than stimuli signaling less complex actions. Irrelevant stim-
uli that are related to action alternatives are assumed to
impact response selection (e.g., Eriksen & Schultz, 1979;
Lu & Proctor, 1995), which suggests that the Wnding of
Meegan and Tipper demonstrates that response selection
reXects action-planning demands. It is diYcult to see how
demonstrations of this sort can be accommodated by
approaches that draw a strong line between response selec-
tion and response programming.
Let us take another example. Stimulus-response compat-
ibility phenomena like the Simon eVect are commonly
attributed to what traditional models call the response-
selection stage (e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990). The idea is
that stimuli tend to activate feature-overlapping responses,
which leads to response conXict and, thus, to a delay of
response selection if the activation targeted the wrong
response. A straightforward prediction from this assump-
tion is that compatibility eVects should disappear if the
response can be selected before the activating stimulus
appears. This prediction clearly failed: Hommel (1995,
1996) validly precued the correct response in each trial of a
Simon task, so that the left or right key press could be
selected and even programmed long before the lateralized
stimulus appeared. Nevertheless, substantial Simon eVects
of undiminished size were obtained. From a TEC point of
view this observation is unsurprising: selecting and pro-
gramming the appropriate action is assumed to consist of
activating the codes that represent the features of that
action, including codes representing the action’s location.
As long as this action plan (i.e., the network of activated
codes) is not executed it must be maintained, and while it is
maintained it is of course vulnerable to changes in the acti-
vation states of the codes it consists of. Processing a stimu-
lus that shares one or more on these codes is likely to
change these activation states (by increasing their activa-
tion in compatible trials or by activating conXicting codes
in incompatible trials), so that there is no reason why com-
patibility eVects should not occur. In contrast, traditional
stage-like approaches face the diYculty to explain how
stimuli can aVect processes that are assumed to be com-
pleted already.
Further problems for traditional approaches come from
studies that used deadline techniques, which require subject
to carry out an action when a go signal is presented irre-
spective of the progress of the planning process. When used
in a manual reaching task, premature go signals have been
found to produce actions that seem to rely on default
parameters, such as the spatial average of the alternative
goal locations (Ghez, Hening & Favilla, 1990; van Sonderen
& Denier van der Gon, 1991). A stepwise increase of the
delay of the go signal led to a continuous transition from
this default parameter to the actual goal parameter. TEC
provides a natural account for this observation: early in the
process of accumulating evidence for one of the spatial
responses the codes representing all possible end locations
will be activated (an assumption that is consistent with
observations from single-cell recordings in monkeys: Cisek
& Kalaska, 2005), so that executing the response at this
point will reXect the joint impact of these activations. As
time passes, the code of the correct response will increas-
ingly dominate and outcompete codes of the alternative
responses, so that the factual end location will approach the
actual target location the later in time the go signal appears.
However, traditional stage approaches face a couple of
problems. One problem is that it is far from obvious how
selection and programming should be distinguished with
aiming tasks of that sort. Another problem is that selection
should take place between symbols that stand for clearly
deWned end locations, so that deadline-induced errors in the
selection process should lead to the execution of alternative
responses but not to spatial averaging.
Another interesting implication of TEC is that it provides
a straightforward explanation for why response selection
represents a capacity-demanding processing bottleneck in
many tasks. That response selection often functions as a
bottleneck has been suspected for a long time. Welford
(1952) was among the Wrst to assume that most cognitive
processes may be able to run in parallel in the service of
multiple tasks but the selection of an action may be an
exception. Indeed, systematic research has accumulated evi-
dence that human multitasking abilities are mainly restricted
by the apparent seriality of response selection (Pashler,
1994). While many authors subscribe to this view, there is
hardly any evidence on and very few theoretical consider-
ations about why that may be the case. Moreover, authors
often fail to distinguish between stimulus-response transla-
tion and response selection, suggesting that the latter is
achieved by the former (i.e., responses are selected by trans-
lating stimuli according to particular rules; e.g., Pashler,
1998). However, in view of the just discussed evidence that
stimulus-response translation proceeds rather automatically
(Hommel, 1998b), the actual bottleneck remains even more
of a mystery. The few ideas that are available consider
response selection proper as a global operation that consid-
ers multiple sources of information and multiple brain areas
(see Hommel, 1998b; Pashler, 1993). Making sure that a
given response is correct requires the agent to integrate sev-
eral pieces of information, such as the given stimulus, the
most activated (but not yet selected) response, and the task
goal. According to TEC, all this information is widely dis-
tributed across the brain, which necessarily renders the pro-
cess responsible for integrating it a global operation. As
brain-imaging studies suggest, global operations monopo-
lize the communication between brain areas and thus create
a bottleneck by temporarily suppressing communication
related to other events (Gross et al., 2004). With regard to522 Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526
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the integration of features for perception, this has led to the
assumption that features can be integrated for only one
event at a time (Treisman, 1988) and, given that TEC does
not distinguish between perceived and produced events, it
makes sense to extend this consideration to the integration
of action features. Along these lines, if and as far as
response selection constitutes a processing bottleneck this is
because the integration process it requires is global and thus
monopolizes communication in the cognitive system.
At this point, it is not clear whether every single action
requires integration (and thus creates a bottleneck) but the
existence of action-related integration has been docu-
mented in several ways. As brieXy mentioned earlier,
Müsseler and Hommel (1997a, b) investigated the impact
of action planning on perceptual processes. They had sub-
jects prepare a left or right key-pressing action and pre-
sented a masked left- or right-pointing arrowhead brieXy
before or during the execution of the key press. The loca-
tion of the key press interacted with the direction of the
arrowhead, which conWrms that action planning can aVect
perception. Interestingly, however, the eVect pattern was
opposite to what one may have expected at Wrst sight:
report of the arrowhead direction was worse if it corre-
sponded to the key press. A positive correspondence eVect
would seem more obvious: planning the action should
involve activating the location code that represents the rela-
tive location of the key and/or the eVector operating it, and
this activation should prime the identiWcation of a feature-
overlapping event—the compatible arrowhead that is.
However, note that the task involved two diVerent events
the coding of which was made to overlap in time. If the
codes relating to these two events would just be activated
but not further integrated, the system would have no means
to determine which code would belong to which event—the
notorious binding problem. An integration process would
need to make sure that a given code is part of one particular
event but not of any other, which should make it diYcult to
use that very code for the representation of another event
(Hommel et al., 2001a,  b; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997b;
Stoet & Hommel, 1999). To illustrate that, consider the
possibility that feature binding operates by means of syn-
chronizing the neural codes representing these features
(Fries, 2005: von der Malsburg, 1999), which would mean
that all neurons that refer to features of the same event will
Wre in the same rhythm. Representing another binding at the
same time with members Wring at the same frequency is
possible in principle, but only if the frequencies diVer in
phase (RaVone & Wolters, 2001). For a code that is related
to multiple events this poses the problem of which phase it
should join (given that joining both by increasing the fre-
quency to the lowest common denominator would require
unrealistically high oscillation frequencies, see Kopell,
Ermentrout, Whittington & Traub, 2000). If we assume that
it is more likely to join and stay with the Wrst binding it was
entrained with, the observations of Müsseler and Hommel
would be easy to understand: planning the action involved
the integration of the corresponding feature codes, includ-
ing location codes, so that integrated codes were not, or not
that easily available for coding the direction of the arrow-
head (Hommel, 2004).4
According to this code-occupation account any inte-
grated binding should impair the integration of any other
feature-overlapping event. Hence, preparing an action and
maintaining the plan in the presence of other, temporally
overlapping events should impair not only perceptual pro-
cesses but other planning operations as well. Stoet and
Hommel (1999) investigated this matter by having subjects
prepare a left or right key-pressing action (A1), perform a
speeded left or right key press to a central stimulus (A2),
and only then carry out the planned action (A1). Perfor-
mance on A2 was clearly aVected by the A1 plan, showing
worse performance if A1 and A2 overlapped in location.
This was the case even if A2 was carried out by hand and
A1 by foot, which excludes an account of the observation
in terms of peripheral interactions or the inhibition of the
A1-related eVector in order to prevent immediate execu-
tion. Moreover, reminding subjects of A1 until it was to be
executed (so that advance planning was not strictly neces-
sary) turned the eVect positive, suggesting that codes were
primed but not yet integrated. This conWrms that code occu-
pation does require feature codes to be integrated. Later
research provided evidence that the code-occupation eVect
is more likely with unpracticed actions and/or eVectors:
Wiediger and Fournier (2008) obtained the eVect for the
left but not the right hand of right-handers. If we assume
that planning an action, in contrast to retrieving a stored
action plan, and integrating the features involved is needed
for unpracticed actions only (Melcher et al., 2008), this
Wnding Wts well with the idea that planning and integration
are related. However, more research is certainly needed
with regard to the question of when and under what circum-
stances integration is necessary and takes place. Particu-
larly interesting is the question whether integration
4 Integrating and thereby temporarily occupying feature codes may
also prevent actions from triggering themselves in a vicious circle.
Carrying out an action produces action eVects and perceiving action
eVects is assumed to prime the corresponding action, which implies
that every action could keep priming itself over and over again
(MacKay, 1986)—a phenomenon that is indeed observed in infants
and known as the circular reXex. The more an agent learns to predict
the eVects of his or her actions, the more the codes of these eVects will
become part of the corresponding action plans. Integrating these codes
will prevent them from responding to the experience of the eventually
produced eVects, which eVectively will prevent the plan from being
activated by them a second time. The same mechanism may also be
responsible for why we can’t tickle ourselves (Blakemore, Wolpert &
Frith, 1998).Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526 523
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presupposes a confusability of features and thus occurs
only if multiple event representations overlap in time.
Monitoring an action
According to ideomotor approaches, including TEC, action
control is strongly anticipatory in nature. For one, this is
obvious from the way these approaches conceive of action
selection, which is assumed to be guided by the previously
experienced and presently expected eVects of the consid-
ered actions. For another, integrating action patterns with
codes of to-be-expected eVects provides an ideal means to
evaluate the success of the action once it is executed.
Cybernetic models of action control assume that this evalu-
ation is achieved by comparing expected action eVects with
actually generated action eVects, the action being more
successful the smaller the discrepancy between them (e.g.,
Adams, 1971; Schmidt, 1975; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000).
Substantial discrepancies would thus signal a failure of
action control, to be remedied in following attempts. Recent
observations from electrophysiological studies support the
idea that acquired action eVects are involved in signaling
action-related errors.
Waszak and Herwig (2007) had subjects acquire associa-
tions between left and right key presses and tones of diVer-
ent pitch, as in the study of Elsner and Hommel (2001),
before presenting them with an auditory oddball task,
where numerous standard tones and infrequent deviants
(tones that diVered from the standards in frequency)
appeared. Auditory deviants produced a P3 component in
the ERPs (Pritchard, 1981) that was more pronounced when
it was preceded by the response that was associated with
the standard. This demonstrates that the acquisition of
action-tone associations aVected tone processing in such a
way that a cortical signal was generated if the currently
generated tone did not match the expected tone.
Along similar lines, Band, van Steenbergen, Ridderink-
hof, Falkenstein, and Hommel (2008), presented subjects
with a probabilistic learning task, in which some key
presses were followed by a tone of a particular pitch in 80%
of the trials and by a tone of another pitch in 20% of the tri-
als. In other words, these key presses produced one more
expected and one less expected auditory action eVect. Inter-
estingly, the less expected eVects generated an ERP compo-
nent that is commonly seen with the presentation of
negative performance feedback, the so-called feedback-
related negativity (FRN: Miltner, Braun & Coles, 1997).
This Wts with the assumption that learned action eVects are
exploited for predicting upcoming events and matched
against actually achieved eVects. There was even some evi-
dence that mismatches lead to adaptations in action control:
reaction times of the trials following the presentation of the
less expected eVects were increased as compared to the
trials following more expected eVects.
Apart from this evaluative function, the comparison
between expected and achieved eVects may play another
role as well. Holroyd and Coles (2002) argued that the
FRN, just like the error-related negativity (Falkenstein,
Hohnsbein, Hoorman, & Blanke, 1990; Gehring, Goss,
Coles, Meyer & Donchin, 1993), reXects a negative rein-
forcement signal from the mesencephalic dopamine system
to modulate reinforcement learning. According to that
view, stimulus-response combinations that lead to the unex-
pected absence of reward lose associative strength, whereas
combinations that lead to the unexpected presence of
reward gain associative strength (see Schultz, 2002). If we
consider that the integration of stimuli and actions is to
some degree blind to the actual sequence of the to-be-inte-
grated events (Hommel, 2005), we can extend this logic to
action-eVect acquisition: novel action eVects are entirely
unexpected, which would induce a dopaminergic boost that
leads to action-eVect integration. With increasing experi-
ence the eVects would become more predictable, which
would reduce the dopaminergic signal and reduce learning,
thus producing the well-known asymptotic learning curve.
For stimulus-response integration in humans, there is
indeed evidence for a dopaminergic basis. Stimulus-action
binding has been found to increase in the presence of
pictures with a positive valence (Colzato, van Wouwe &
Hommel, 2007a), which are assumed to drive dopaminergic
activity to a more eVective level, and to decrease under
stress (Colzato, Kool & Hommel, 2008), which is assumed
to drive dopaminergic activity beyond eVective levels.
Along the same lines, stimulus-action binding is stronger in
populations that are likely to have a more eVective dopami-
nergic supply at their disposal, such as people with high
spontaneous eye-blink rates (Colzato, van Wouwe &
Hommel, 2007b) and recreational cannabis users (Colzato
& Hommel, 2008).
Conclusions
One of the aims of this article is to caution against the wide-
spread tendency to take the setups of the experimental tasks
we use in our laboratories too seriously and to tailor our
theories too tightly to them. Presenting carefully selected
stimuli and measuring arbitrary responses to them provides
many advantages, but real actions are commonly not driven
by stimuli, not carried out to subserve meaningless goals,
and not aimed at carrying out movements for their own
sake. Few theories account for that but many still consider
the stimulus as the precursor and main predictor of action.
One purpose of formulating TEC was to provide an alterna-
tive perspective that allows (better) to take intentions and524 Psychological Research (2009) 73:512–526
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the goal-directed nature of action into consideration, and to
do so in a neurobiologically plausible way. TEC makes an
attempt to explain that and how human action is anticipa-
tory in nature, how anticipations emerge through experi-
ence, and how the anticipation of action eVects comes to
regulate human behavior. In particular, we have seen that
anticipations serve at least two purposes: the selection of
appropriate actions and the evaluation of action outcomes
in the context of a particular goal.
Another aim of this article was to show that TEC does
not yet provide a full-Xedged account of action but that it
provided fruitful guidelines for asking new questions,
generating new data, and interpreting them in the context of
a coherent theoretical framework. However, more work
needs to be done. Among other things, a better understand-
ing is needed for how more complex, multistep actions are
acquired and controlled, how motivational processes aVect
the preparation and execution of actions, and how individ-
ual learning and experience, and external constraints inter-
act to create action goals. From a TEC perspective, this
calls for connecting the basic architecture to self-related
long-term structures and for getting to grips with the neuro-
modulators that are driving the activation and integration of
feature codes.
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